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ABSTRACT 
 
Banks must maintain minimum capital levels, but a regulated balance sheet implies profit 
suboptimization.  Moreover, the presumptive role of minimum capital in reducing insolvency risk 
may be misplaced.  Evidence is presented that suggests a bank’s level of capital may not 
accurately presage the risk of loan default.  Regulators must exercise restraint in further 
increasing bank capital levels, as unintended consequences may make matters worse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
anking is undoubtedly one of the most regulated industries in the world and the rules on bank capital 
are one of the most prominent aspects of such regulation. This prominence results from the central 
role that banks play in financial intermediation, the importance of bank capital for bank soundness, 
and the efforts of the international community to adopt common bank capital standards.  This influence was one of 
the key factors behind the international efforts to harmonize capital standards in the 1980s (Madura, 2007). 
 
The increased number of bank failures over this past year has raised concerns about the riskiness of banks 
and, hence, prompted movements for tighter capital requirements. The Basel Agreement of 1988 requires that banks 
in the United States and in many European countries meet the minimum capital ratios of four percent tier 1 capital 
and eight percent tier 1 plus tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets.
1 
 
1‘Tier 1 capital consists mainly of common stock and some perpetual preferred stock.  Tier 2 capital includes 
preferred stock, subordinated debt, and allowance for loan losses.  In calculating risk-weighted assets, assets are 
classified into four risk-weight categories; i.e. zero percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent risk-weight 
category. For example, most government securities fall into the zero risk-weight category, claims guaranteed by 
depository institutions are given 20 percent risk-weight, loans fully secured by first liens on residential properties 
are included in 50 percent risk-weight category, and most other loans fall into 100 percent risk-weight category. 
Risk weights are also applied to the credit-equivalent amount of off-balance-sheet items. 
 
The capital requirement, which imposes constraints on the capital structure of banks, can affect the 
weighted average cost of capital (the average cost of equity and debt weighted by their proportions) and, hence, the 
investment decision of banks.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The well-known proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) is independent of capital structure when the costs of equity and debt are determined in a frictionless 
market.  In the banking sector, the cost of debt (deposits) is not determined by the market since deposits are insured.  
In addition, the cost of equity can deviate from market fundamentals when there is information asymmetry between 
managers and the stock market.  Assuming that deposit financing is cheaper than equity financing due to 
underpriced deposit insurance premiums, using a higher proportion of equity increases the WACC.  An increased 
weighted average cost of capital will reduce the number of profitable investment opportunities.   In this case, the 
B 
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capital requirement limits the banks’ ability to take advantage of the value derived from the deposit insurance, i.e., 
risk that is not reflected in the interest rate on deposits.   
 
There is a second effect of the capital requirement that may unduly limit the growth potential of banks.  
Finance literature suggests that the cost of equity can be excessively high on occasion.  The stock of a firm can be 
mispriced due to asymmetric information between the management of the firm and the stock market (Ting, 2005; 
Eden and Boyan, 1994).  Managers are better informed about the future cash flow of the firm.  Issuing shares at an 
unfavorable price (below the present value of the future cash flow estimated by managers) dilutes the value of 
existing shares.  Assuming managers have favorable inside information and act in the interest of existing 
shareholders, they may pass up a good investment opportunity rather than issue shares to finance the investment. 
 
Given this logic, the statutory capital requirement, which necessitates some equity financing, can restrain 
banks from pursuing profitable investment opportunities.  In this case, banks may be handicapped by the capital 
requirement which limits the choice among financing alternatives. This effect of the capital requirement is not only 
undesirable but also disruptive.  The investment decision of a bank may change with the degree of information 
asymmetry faced by the bank.  Thus, in assessing the effects of the capital requirement, it is important to understand 
the role of asymmetric information. 
 
The findings of previous studies generally support the presence of asymmetric information.  They examine 
the investment behavior of commercial firms and find a positive relationship between the firms’ cash flow from 
financing activities and investment [Fazzari et  al.(1988) and Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990)].  The positive 
relationship, they argue,  indicates the difficulty of external financing that may arise from asymmetric information.  
Since  bank assets, loans in particular, are information intensive, information asymmetry is likely to be  more serious 
in the banking sector than in many other industries producing standardized  products.  In addition, the effect of 
information asymmetry will be more pronounced when equity financing is necessary.        
 
The financial distress that followed the implosion of markets for securitized mortgages in 2007 has raised 
profound doubts about the adequacy of the regulatory regime presently in place.  In particular, the use of the 
CAMELS rating scheme, hereafter ―CAMELS.‖  The acronym stands for:  capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market conditions.  CAMELS is a U.S. supervisory rating 
of the bank's overall condition used to classify the nation’s 8,500 banks. This rating is based on financial statements 
of the bank and on-site examination by regulators like the Fed, the OCC and FDIC. The scale is from 1 to 5 with 1 
being strongest and 5 being weakest. These ratings are not released to the public but only to the top management of 
the banking company to prevent a bank run on a bank which has a bad CAMELS rating.  This veil of secrecy may 
be misguided.  Not that depositors would withdraw funds in reaction to a middling CAMELS score since their 
deposits are largely insured.  But there is no evidence indicating a deposit outflows would be an undesirable 
outcome.  A related, unanswered question is whether this disclosure would motivate bankers to ―mind the shop‖ 
more wisely. 
 
CAMELS is being used by the United States government in response to the global financial crisis of 2008 
to help it decide which banks to provide special help for and which to not as part of its capitalization program 
authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.   
 
A cornerstone of the CAMELS is ―C,‖ capital adequacy.  Capital ratios have long been a valuable tool for 
assessing the safety and soundness of banks.  The informal use of ratios by bank regulators and supervisors goes 
back well over a century (Mitchell, 1909).  In the United States, minimum capital ratios have been required in 
banking regulation since 1981, and the Basel Accord has applied capital ratio requirements to banks internationally 
since 1988.   
 
CAPITAL RATIOS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF FAILURE 
 
A bank's Tier One Risk-Based Capital Ratio is a bank's common equity divided by its risk-adjusted assets.  
It is a key measure of a bank's ability to withstand future loan losses.  A bank must maintain a ratio of six percent or 
more to be considered "well capitalized" by regulators.   
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A bank's net charge-off ratio is the percentage of its loans that are written off as bad debts, less recoveries. 
A ratio of three percent or more is considered too high.  A significant negative relationship between the capital ratio 
and the charge-off ratio should be expected.  That is, a bank with a high capital ratio is presumably in a conservative 
financial posture.  The charge-off ratio for such an institution would be expected to be very low. 
 
Although bank regulators have relied on capital ratios formally or informally for a very long time, they 
have not always used the ratios in the same way.  For instance, in the days before explicit capital requirements, bank 
supervisors would use capital ratios as rules of thumb to gauge the adequacy of an institution’s level of capital. 
There was no illusion that the simple ratios used (for example, capital to total assets or capital to deposits) could 
provide an accurate measure of the appropriate capital level for a bank, but large deviations of actual capital ratios 
from supervisory benchmarks suggested the need for further scrutiny.  When capital ratios were introduced formally 
in regulation in 1981, they were applied in a different way.  The regulatory requirement set a minimum level of 
capital that the institution had to hold.  The degree to which the requirement was binding depended significantly on 
the type of institution because, then as now, there was substantial diversity among banking institutions (Gilbert, 
Stone, and Trebing; 1985).  Several classes of institutions were initially defined and accorded different treatment by 
the regulation.  Basically, the requirements were most binding for less than a couple of dozen large banks, whereas 
smaller banks were generally already in compliance with the more stringent requirements (Berger, Herring, Giorgio, 
1995).   
 
The Basel Accord of 1988 attempted to deal with the diversity in institutional activities by applying 
different credit risk weights to different positions and by including in the base for the capital ratio a measure of the 
off-balance-sheet exposures of the bank.  Despite these calibrations, the intent was not to determine an exact 
appropriate level of capital for the bank, but rather to provide a more flexible way of determining the minimum 
required level (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1988).  Risk weighting effectively requires financial 
institutions to charge more capital for riskier assets, discouraging them from holding risky assets.  By responding to 
the risk-reducing incentives, banks can increase the risk-weighted ratio without raising capital.  On the other hand, 
failure to respond would result in a low risk-weighted ratio. Thus, if risk weights accurately reflect the riskiness of 
assets, the risk-weighted ratio should better distinguish between risky and safe banks and should be a more effective 
predictor of bank failure than simple ratios.  Inaccuracy is unavoidable, however.  Because each loan is unique, it is 
difficult to evaluate the credit risk of bank assets.  In addition, the business of banking is subject to significant 
sources of risk other than credit risk, such as interest rate risk, operational risk, and reputational risk.  Weighting 
assets can weaken the relationship between the capital ratio and these other risks—operational risk in particular.  
Furthermore, the financial sector is so dynamic that new products are introduced continuously.  Even a well-
designed risk-weighting scheme may soon become obsolete as new instruments provide means of economizing on 
regulatory capital (Cole and Gunther, 1995).  Considering these difficulties, it is not surprising that a singular 
measure such as the capital ratio fails to capture the totality of risk facing a bank.  Tarullo (2009) presents ample 
evidence of the costs of relying too heavily on capital requirements for effective bank regulation. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To assess the predictive efficacy of the Tier One Risk-Based Capital Ratio, the Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient is applied to the relationship between the capital ratio and the charge-off ratio, the ultimate indictor of 
loan failure.  All 429 Minnesota-chartered banks, first-quarter, 2009, are utilized. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
A Pearson correlation coefficient of -.3507 corroborates the negative relationship expected between the 
level of bank capital and the level of charged off loans.  However, this relationship is rather weak, suggesting that 
while the capital ratio may presage financial difficulties, it is by no means a tell-tale of imminent trouble.  In fact, of 
the 429 banks in this study, only five had capital ratios below 6%, yet twenty had charge-off ratios at 3% or higher.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Regulated bank capital may result in capital structure suboptimization.  Banks are subject to significant 
information asymmetry.  This, coupled with relatively low cost insured liabilities, suggests a relatively high cost for 
bank capital.  Further regulatory constraints may only exacerbate this situation and bank capital may not be a 
reliable harbinger of loan charge-offs.  Reliance on bank capital levels as a primary tool of risk assessment, in both 
an academic and professional context, is short cited.  A more circumspect risk assessment, with greater public 
disclosure of a bank’s CAMELS condition and a shift in attention from sources to uses of bank funds, would better 
serve the interests of bank managers, shareholders, and regulators.   
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